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A RENAISSANCE OF THE
CIVILIAN TRADITION IN LOUISIANA
Mack E. Barham*
In 1937 in response to an article which contained the statement that "Louisiana is today a common law State,"' four eminent professors of law in a reappraisal of the civil law system
in Louisiana 2 concluded that Louisiana was then still "a civil
law jurisdiction." We were then and are now a civilian jurisdiction, and had and have a civilian system. Again, however, a
reappraisal will be made here to determine to what extent we
did and do adhere to the civil law traditionin Louisiana.
John Henry Merryman 8 has defined a legal system as "an
operating set of legal institutions, procedures and rules." He
says that in this sense there is no such thing as a civil law
system, a common law system, or a socialist law system, for
each sovereignty tends to deviate from its original or basic
system. He defines a legal tradition as
"a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes
about the role of law in the society and in the polity, about
the proper organization and operation of a legal system,
and about the way law is or should be made, applied, studied,
perfected and taught .... It puts the legal system into cultural perspective."
As used in this paper, "civil law tradition" means that tradition of legal concepts and principles as generally applied today
by a community of jurisdictions with a somewhat similar development and evolvement from the Twelve Tables of Rome and
the work of Roman jurisconsults. It will refer to concepts of
the nature and role of law, the methods of operation of a legal
system, the manners of applying and perfecting the law which
are most commonly accepted and practiced by the numerous
civil law systems. "Civil law system" or "civilian system" as
used here will be more nearly aligned with "civil law jurisdiction." It will mean the system of law employed in a partic* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana.
1. Ireland, LouAstana's Legal System Reappra4sed, 11 TUL. L. REv. 585
(1937).
2. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert & McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A
Brief for the Civ4l Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. Rxv. 12 (1937).
3. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (1969).
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ular jurisdiction that intentionally attempts to embody the civil
law tradition.
REAPPRAISAL OF

"A

REAPPRAISAL APPRAISED"

This writer's legal education in the mid '40s consisted of
civil law studies in Louisiana State University and of common
law courses in the university of a common law state.4 While
the civil law tradition was treated in the context of specific
civil law courses and students were constantly reminded that
Louisiana was a civil law system or jurisdiction, there was no
unified approach to why these obtained in Louisiana. There was
no in-depth instruction as to the advantage of advancing the
civil law tradition in the midst of a nation of states employing
a contrary approach. Except in the teaching of a few professors,
the teaching methodology employed in civil law courses in the
civilian tradition was not strikingly different from the instruction given in the common law courses in the common law jurisdiction. Although our Code provisions are explainable through
jurisprudence, too often, whether intentionally or not, by the
use of cases the student was led to a belief that law was what
the jurisprudence pronounced. The Louisiana Civil Code was
our source, but a neophyte in the study of law found it difficult
to distinguish between the casebook method in common law
courses and the study of case interpretation in Code courses.
These remarks are not to be taken as condemning either
the teaching methods adopted or the roles assumed in our
system of law by the faculties of the Louisiana law schools.
Rather, they are intended to direct attention to the pressures
which have been exercised upon these faculties to divert them
from the civil law tradition; and they are intended to focus upon
the law schools' dominant role in bringing lawyer, legislator,
teacher, and judge back to the civilian tradition in Louisiana.
Most lawyers, teachers, and jurists believe in retaining a strong
civilian tradition. However, the necessity of earning a living
by the practice of law, by teaching law students how to be
winning advocates, and by making quick judicial decisions to
keep up with an ever-increasing caseload has made it expedient
for the lawyer, the teacher, and the judge to adopt methods and
4. University of Colorado.
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give answers which, if they do not detract from the civil law
tradition, at least do not support it.
In a consideration of only the role and function of the
judiciary in the civil law tradition, there are found in our jurisprudence deviations from that tradition which are so consistent
as to require, if followed, that lawyers, teachers, and judges not
use a civilian approach. Under our Code and through the historical civilian tradition, jurisprudence is not a major source
of law, yet it has been and it remains such in reality. Possibly
the belief in jurisprudence as a primary source of law is so
strongly embedded in the minds of many of the judiciary and
the practicing bar of Louisiana because our civil law system
coexists in a nation with states which because of their common
law heritage so regard jurisprudence. Even if our bar really
believes that legislation is the primary source of law, it practices under the principle that jurisprudence is a major source
of law. Lawyers often only perfunctorily examine legislative
expression before they turn for final authority to the jurisprudence to resolve the legal question posed by their clients'
cases. When the court asks the lawyer in argument to give
the authority for a point which he advocates, the court probably
expects a case citation even where there is positive codal or
statutory authority. As a result of the pressure under which
we perform our various roles in our legal system, there has
been a tendency to stray from strict civilian methods and
concepts.
My many visits to the law schools as a lecturer have made
apparent the broad gap between the teacher and the lawyer
and the judge in their understanding of their respective functions and roles in the civil law system. Because of these differences a variety of deviations from the civil law tradition in
these spheres of influence caused the formation of a vicious
circle of departure. The faculties of the law schools may feel
compelled to use the casebook method of teaching if they are
to fulfill the immediate need of their students to pass the bar
examination, designed by the lawyer, and to become successful
practitioners before the courts. Then these attorneys practicing
in our courts, because of their teaching and their response to
some decisional requirements, cite the opinions of the courts
as the primary authority of law in their legal arguments. It is
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immaterial whether the courts actually require or have merely
learned to expect the citation of decisions as a primary source
of law, for their opinions do in fact often hinge upon the holdings in particular cases. These decisions are studied in the law
schools, and the faculties may well feel justified in using the
casebook method in order to prepare their graduates to respond
with what courts' opinions indicate is decisive of litigation. This
circle can be broken at any one point, but for us to begin a
return to a true civilian concept, it must be obliterated. Fortunately, its destruction has already begun, and this beginning
must be attributed to the law schools.
ThIE ACADEMICIANS: WELLSPRING OF THE RENAISSANCE

The renaissance of Louisiana as a civil law jurisdiction practicing in the civilian tradition has come about through a number
of factors. The increasing enrollment of students in our law
schools required able administrators to assemble larger faculties.
They have retained civilian scholars with national reputations,
but also they have acquired new professors with broad comparative and civil law backgrounds who have quickly gained
reputations as outstanding exponents of civilian doctrine. Faculty
members new and old have produced a mounting library on
the Louisiana civil law system. Our law reviews have been
expanded, and under the supervision of able faculty members
these publications have been revitalized. They furnish authoritative and learned writings in every field of civilian law, and
are a primary source of doctrine in Louisiana.
In France and in most European jurisdictions doctrine is
a tremendous force in shaping the legislative expression as
well as the judicial application of the law. Until recently Louisiana had little doctrine available in the English language,
and the scarcity of French translations for lawyers, legislators,
and judges deprived Louisiana of a most necessary tool in a
legal system following the civilian tradition. For example, in
France doctrinal criticism often was and is more impressive
for future legislation and judicial interpretation than the brief
statements in the decisions by the courts.5 One of the most
5. R. DAVID & H. DEVRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYsTEM: AN INTRODUCTION
To CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 122-26 (1958); J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION
59-64 (1969).
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helpful continuing doctrinal sources in Louisiana is the annual
symposium on the work of the appellate courts by the faculty
of the Louisiana State University Law School through the Louisiana Law Review. Tulane University School of Law proposes,
in addition to its law review, periodic publications of research
papers limited to examination of specific areas of the civil law.6
A powerful force tending to keep Louisiana a civil law system in the best of the civil law tradition is the Louisiana State
Law Institute. It was created by legislative act in 1938, 7 and has
in numerous ways contributed to our return to the civilian
tradition. The Law Institute, under charge from the legislature,
produced the projet for our Criminal Code in 1942, our Revised
Statutes of 1950, and the Code of Civil Procedure in 1960 with
the corresponding revisions in the Civil Code necessarily accompanying it, and under legislative mandate and authority it is
constantly revising and attempting to update all of the laws of
the state. Also the Law Institute has made available what now
amounts to a considerable library of translations of a number
of French authorities.8
The Institute of Civil Law Studies9 at Louisiana State University is also making a considerable contribution. It has con6. TULANE CIV. LAW FORUM, to be published bimonthly beginning February, 1973, by the Tulane School of Law.
7. La. Acts 1938, No. 166. The Louisiana State Law Institute was conceived in 1932 within the faculty of the Law School of Louisiana State
University. A prospectus was drafted In 1933, but it was not organized until
1938 when the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University and the
Legislature chartered it in accordance with that prospectus as an "official
advisory law revision commission, law reform agency and legal research
agency of the state of Louisiana." John H. Tucker, Jr., who was its first
and longtime president, along with Dean Paul M. Hebert, prepared the
legislation. Dr. J. Denson Smith was its first and continues to be its
Director. See Smith, Historical Sketch of the Louisiana State Law Institute,
245 La. 124 (1963).
8. PLANOL, CWM LAw TREATISE 3 vols. (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1969);
G

y,

METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE PosiTIVE LAW

(La. St.

L. Inst. transl. 1963); AUBRY & RAU, CIVIL LAw TRANSLATIONS 4 vols. (La. St.
L. Inst. transl.) OBLIGATIONS (1965), PROPERTY (1966), TESTAMENTARY SUCCEsSIONS & GRArTuious DISPOSITIONS (1969), INTESTATE SUCCESSIONS (1971); BAUDRYLACANTINERIE & TISSIER, AUBRY & RAU, CARBONNIER, CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS

(La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1972) PRESCRIPTION.
9. The Institute of Civil Law Studies was founded In 1967 by a separate
charter issued by the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University
to function within the framework of the School of Law with Professor
Joseph Dainow as Director. Its purposes are to encourage and facilitate
research and publication in the areas of civil law and comparative law.
It also sponsors seminars, symposia, and lecture programs in these flields
of study.
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ducted annually an in-depth seminar concentrating on the function of a judge in a civil law jurisdiction in the best of the
civilian tradition. Under the sponsorship of the Law Institute
with some assistance from the Institute of Civil Law Studies,
a number of civil law treatises from our own doctrinal writers
have been prepared,' 0 and others are in preparation. The de la
Vergne Manuscript, 1 Batiza's Sources of the 1808 Civil Code,"2
and the scholastic debate 3 which followed their publication
stimulated historical research into the various systems as our
doctrinal writers sought for the sources of our Code. Since the
civilian judiciary is influenced by academicians far more than
are the jurists in common law systems, the Louisiana courts, as
expected, have responded to these new doctrinal sources. It is
the resurgence of the civilian tradition as expressed by the
courts through their opinions under provocation by academic
influence that brings new hope for a strong civilian tradition
in our legal system.
Part of the response of the law schools which has accounted
for a resurgence of the civilian tradition in Louisiana has been
the inclusion in the first-year curriculum of an introductory
4
course to the civil law.1

10. A. YIANNOPOULOS, 2 LOUISIANA CIvIL LAw TREATISE, PROPERTY (1967); A.
YIANNOPOULOS, 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, PERSONAL SERVITUDES (1968);

S. LrmwNoI'I, 6 LOUISIANA CIviL LAW TREATISE, OBLIGATIONS BK. I (1969).
11. MOREAU LISLET, A

DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAws Now IN FORCE IN THE TER-

RITORY OF ORLEANS (1808) (de la Vergne vol. 1968).
12. BATIZA, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and
Present Relevance, 46 TuL. L. REV. 4 (1971).
13. Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza,
46 TUL. L. REv. 603 (1972); Sweeney, Tournament of Scholars Over the
Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, 46 TUL. L. Rsv. 585 (1972).

14. This paper was first conceived as a review of the coursebook for
first-year students by A. N. Yiannopoulos, Professor of Law at LOuisiana
State University. This coursebook gives to the first-year law student a
succinct, well organized, cohesive text which develops the source and the
history of the civil law tradition, makes a comparative analysis of the
systems which follow that tradition, traces the development of codification, provides an understanding of the fundamental concepts of our own
Civil Code, and gives a basic statement of the philosophy and theory of
the civil law tradition which makes it valuable as developed and practiced
in our jurisdiction. The book then introduces the law student to a historical,
comprehensive,

and philosophical

study of the preliminary title and

the

first two books of our Civil Code. The contents of a large part of the
introductory remarks In this paper are based upon the material In this
coursebook. Another excellent work used in this introductory course Is
S.

LITVINOFY &

W.

TETE, LOUISIANA

JURIDICAL ACTS (1969).

LEGAL TRANSACTIONS:

THE CIVIL LAW

OF
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THE JUDIcIAL ROLE AS A MEASURE OF THE CMLIAN TRADITION

Legal scholars, jurists, and philosophers over the centuries
have tried to define the civilian tradition. Each jurisdiction
which attempts to follow the civilian tradition will have its own
civil law system with varying deviations from the numerous
other systems throughout the world. Civil law tradition is the
oldest of all legal traditions and encompasses more national
jurisdictions than any other. It has been more influential in the.
development of new legal systems, and it has had more impact
upon the other traditions than they have had upon it. We often
oversimplify in making a definitive statement of what is the
civil law tradition. A particular system of law cannot be defined
as a civil law system just because its source is the Roman law,
for the common law is strongly influenced by the Roman law.
Civil law is not necessarily codified law, for France was a civil
law jurisdiction without code before 1804, as was Germany
before 1900 and Greece as late as 1946. Neither can we dismiss
the common law with an oversimplified definition that it is
jurisprudential law under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Civil law tradition can best be examined comparatively
with the other two legal traditions' 5 when we look to the natures
and roles of the judicial and legislative processes. Even though
there is lack of total uniformity in the respective roles assigned
to these branches of government in countries which follow the
civil law, all civil law systems have much in common which
holds them together in a single tradition. Common to all civil
law systems is the fundamental tenet that legislative expression
is the primary source of law, and common to all civil law
systems now is the comprehensive written and integrated basic
text of that legislative expression. While the role, the authority,
the province, and the power of the judiciary may appear on
the surface to be the same in the many systems, in practice
there is considerable variation." This variation in the role and
function of the judiciary appears in the decision-making process
15. Common law and socialist legal traditions.
16. DAINow,

The Method of Legal Development through Judicial Inter-

pretation in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, 22 Rv. JUR. U.P.R. 108 (1953);
Loussouarn, The Relative Importance of Legislation, Custom, Doctrine, and
Precedent in French Law, 18 LA. L. REv. 235 (1958); Tate, Techniques of
Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana, 22 LA. L. Rrv. 727 (1962); Tate, The

Law-Making Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L. Ruv. 211 (1968).
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in cases where the written law is ambiguous or obsolete or where
there is no written law.
Common law scholars often depict the role of the judiciary
in a civilian tradition as mechanical, 17 but that opinion is based
largely on the folklore and the fiction' s which mask the actual
role of the judiciary as played in the many civil law systems.
Here in Louisiana, for example, the judge, the lawyer, and the
layman all want to believe that a judge makes a judicial determination simply by applying "the law" which the legislator has
enacted to the case before him. Actually, there is no invariable
single judicial process which assures that a judge will be led
not only to "the law" but also to a logical and reasonable application of that legislative expression to the facts and circumstances
of the case he must decide. While many may wish that the
judicial process were merely mechanical and functional, such
a process would often require the judge to reach unconscionably
unjust results.
The concept of the judge's role as purely mechanical or
functional is largely formed through both lawyers' and laymen's
anxiety for certainty under the law. Certainty is a quality which
all men of the law assign as a primary requirement of the law.
However, that certainty in the law which would be exacted
by some would deprive the courts of the power to temper the
harshness of the rule of law in a particular case and would
permit prior erroneous expressions to prevail over major legislative policy considerations. Moreover, such certainty would
prevent the primary attainment desired under the law, justice
through reason. A purely mechanistic role for the judiciary
would in fact obviate the need for a judiciary, so that the
sovereignty could function with only a legislator to express
the law and an enforcer to put the law into effect.
Frangois G6ny, 19 "an unquestioned member of the club of
legal classics,'

20

has been one of the most influential writers

17. Von Mehren, The Judicial Process in the United States and in
France-A Comparative Study, 22 Rrv. JUR. U.P.R. 235 (1953).
18. J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 86 (1969); F. GhNY, METHOD
OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITE LAW (La. St. L. Inst. transI.
1963).
19. 1861-1959.
20. F. GhNY, METHOD OF INTERPRETATION AND SOURCES OF PRVATE POSITIVE

LAW (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1963), A Critical Introduction by Jaro Mayda,
at V.
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in determining the function and role of the judge in modern
civil law systems. Gdny's critics have given many labels to his
legal philosophy, but perhaps, as Jaro Mayda, one of his translators and admirers, notes, the philosophical category "eclectic,"
meant to be denigrating and derogatory by some of G6ny's
critics, 21 best fits his proposed approach of methodology in the

judicial function. "Eclectic" is defined as selecting or choosing
from various sources, not following any one system but selecting
and using the best elements of all systems. In order to describe
and to propose the proper judicial role or function in the best
civilian tradition, G6ny brings to the civil law tradition the best
approaches of all of the systems that have used the civil law.
Gdny offers the "free scientific approach" as a replacement for
the often fictional functional approach.
G6ny rejects the "traditional" method of determining the
proper rule of law in a case. G6ny would adhere to the principle
that a judge must apply the rule of law furnished by the legislator whenever it is applicable, but in the absence of written
law he directs the judge to resort to custom, which he defines
broadly. In the absence of both of these sources he would direct
the judge to "a free objective search for rules" (libre recherche
scientifique). According to G6ny, the judge should utilize independent scientific procedures in the absence of formal law
authority by examining "the objective nature of things" for "the
balance of interests" which would suggest the proper rule rather
than by fixing a rule "by means of a forced interpretation of
statutory texts."22 G6ny believes that the object of the judge is
to discover the deeper realities in the context of society "upon
which even the formal sources of law are based, in order to
find the correct rule to apply where the written law is silent."28
G6ny advocates deduction by analogy from existing law and
custom, but requires further an examination of the ideals and
the ideas which have built the political, economic, and social
structures of the society in order to determine the essential
purposes to be served by the law. Actually his approach permits
the utilization of any method of intellectual research which
would obtain a rule of law based upon social utility and validity.
21. G6ny was apparently considered by many of his contemporaries to
be conservative or at least positioned In the middle of the road.
22. F. GtNY, supra note 20, at 420.
23. Book Review, 25 LA. L. Rv. 577, 584 (1965).
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All of us who act as judges do so with some preconceived
idea of the judicial function, with some deeply ingrained ideas
of the role of the judge. With these preconceptions we turn
out a work-product which we hope fits within the framework
of what we believe is our constitutional and legal directive in a
government organized for strict separation of powers. However,
scrutiny through objective research will reveal that what we
do is not always what we say or think we do. Frangois G6ny's
greatest contribution is that he forces the modern jurist to look
beyond the fiction, the facade, of the role of the judge.
FUNCTIONS OF A CIVILIAN JUDGE

In many civilian jurisdictions the sources of law available
to the judge are established through the historical development
of custom. Few codes in other civil law systems contain the
numerous definitions which are to be found in the Louisiana
Civil Code; but it was fortunate that our Code was express
in defining the role of the court and the sources of law, for the
members of the judiciary who attempted to interpret and apply
the Code, especially in the early years, were often trained at
common law and acted without a historical heritage of the
civil law customs. Louisiana now has such a legal heritage that
the definitions should be deleted from our Code, for the express
words of the Code assigning the sources of law have often been
24
cause for dispute in our jurisprudence.
The first chapter of our Civil Code is "Of Law" and contains only three articles. Article 1 provides that "Law is a solemn
expression of legislative will," and article 3 provides: "Customs
result from a long series of actions constantly repeated, which
have by such repetition, and by uninterrupted acquiescence,
acquired the force of a tacit and common consent." Under the
chapter "Of the Application and Construction of Laws," we
find article 13, which provides: "When a law is clear and free
from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded,
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." And article 21, also
in that chapter, reads: "In all civil matters, where there is no
24. See, e.g., Ellis v. Prevost, 13 La. 230 (1839); Dainow, The Method of
Legal Development through Judicial Interpretation in Louisiana and Puerto
Rico, 22 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 108 (1953); for discussion that codes should avoid
definitions see Morrison, The Need for a Revision of the Louisiana Civil

Code, 11 TUL. L. Rzv. 213 (1937).
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express law, the judge is bound to proceed and decide according
to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural
law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is
silent."2 5 (Emphasis here and elsewhere has been added.) These
articles have no counterparts in the Code Napoleon.
Our Code, then, has established in express language the
primary source of law-legislative expression, the secondary
source of law-custom, and even the tertiary source of lawnatural law and reason or received usages. It is important to
note the Code's recognition that law is not always the legislative
expression.26
While the French did not define the sources of law, their
mandate to the judges under Code Civil article 4 recognizes the
need for sources other than the legislative written expression.
That article states: "Judges who refuse to give a decision under
pretext of silence, obscurity or inadequacy of legislation may
be proceeded against as guilty of denial of justice." Just as
G~ny found many years after the enactment of the French Code
that the legislative will or even intent was not always ascertainable, Locr627 reached that same conclusion at the very time
of the Code's adoption. As Locr6 comments,2S before the adoption of the Code the French courts, under strict interpretation
of an order of the Constitutional Assembly, concluded they were
forbidden to act when the legislation was not clear and express.
Accordingly they went to the legislature when they believed
there was need for interpretation or new legislation. Article 4
of the French Code was designed to reinforce the judiciary's
25. See A. YIANNOPOULoS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM §§ 34, 38 (1971);
Dainow, The Method of Legal Development through Judicial Interpretation
in Louisiana and Puerto Rico, 22 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 108 (1953).
26. The original French version of article 1 reads: "La lo est une
d~claration solemnelle de la volont6 lgislative, sur un objet gn4ral et de
rdgime int6rieur." The pertinent part of the article, retained in our present
code, reads in English: "Law is a solemn expression of legislative will."
Most translators attribute to the French word "loi" the meaning "legislation," and translate "droit" to encompass the "law" in all its aspects. Following the French version in our earlier codes, Professor Yiannopoulos says
that article 1 ought to be translated "legislation is a formal expression of
legislative will." If this be so, that expression alone leaves room for sources
of law other than legislation. A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM
§ 32 (1971).
27. J. LoC , ESPRIT DU CODE NAPOL12ON (1805).
28. Paraphrasing an unpublished translation of a portion of Locrd's
ESPRIT DU CODE NAPOLON (1805) by Dean Joseph M. Sweeney of the Tulane
University School of Law.
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obligation to decide the specific litigation before it. Locr6 says:
"The power to decide cases, even when the law is silent,
is essential to the function of the courts.
"If the nature of things could be so ordered as to write in
advance in the text of the legislation a formal resolution
of all conceivable disputes, judges would no longer be
needed; the decisions being ready-made, there would be
need no longer of persons to apply the law, but only of
persons to enforce it."29
Geny and Locr6 require a judge to objectively examine his
determination of the rule of law in a case to determine the
actual source from which it is obtained and the utility of that
rule in society. They would strip away the folklore and the
fiction, and look to the actualities and practicalities of judicial
interpretation and application. If Louisiana jurisprudence is in
29. Further quoting from Dean Sweeney's translation of Locr6: "Indeed,
legislation deals with the totality of men; considers men in the mass, never
as individuals; it must not meddle with particular facts or with lawsuits
which divide citizens. Were it otherwise, It would be necessary to make
new laws daily; their multitude would destroy their dignity and endanger
their observance. The Judge would be without function, and the legislator,
enmeshed in details, would soon be no more than a judge. Private interests
would besiege the legislative power; they would divert it, at every moment,
from the general welfare of the society.
"There is a science for legislators, as there is one for Judges; and the
one does not resemble the other. The science of the legislator consists in
finding, for each matter, the rules most favorable to the common good;
the science of the judge is to put these principles into operation, to ramify
them, to extend them, through wise and reasoned application, to private
issues; to study the spirit of the law when its letter would be deadly; and
not to expose himself to the risk of being in turn slave and rebel, and
disobeying through servility.
"The legislator must watch the case law; he may be enlightened by it,
and he may, on the other hand, correct it; but there must be a case law.
With the immensity of diverse issues which make up civil litigation, and
of which the decision requires, in the majority of cases, less the application
of a specifl provision than the combining of several provisions which
lead to the decision instead of providing it, one can no more do without
case law than without legislation. Now, it is to case law that the Civil Code
leaves the rare and unusual situations which cannot be included in a
scheme of rational legislation, the details, too varied and debatable, which
must not preoccupy the legislator, and all subjects which it would be useless
to try foreseeing or which hasty foreseeing could not define without danger.
It is for experience to supply as time goes on the gaps which the Civil
Code leaves. The codes of a people make themselves with time; but properly
speaking, one does not make them.
"In enacting laws for every unforeseen issue, we would soon overwhelm
our legislation with a prodigious quantity of laws which would destroy its
unity and serve to shackle the administration of justice."
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part court lawmaking, then the court should not act under the
fiction and the facade that it only interprets legislative will.
Louisiana judges are expressly mandated by the Code to
decide the litigation before them, and are given three sources
of law for use in the decisional processes. The civil law tradition implements these sources through doctrine and jurisprudence constante. In removing some of the fiction which surrounds the judicial process we might begin by accepting the
fact that there is not express legislative will to be found in any
source of legislation which will be dispositive of every case.
Since there are sources of law other than legislative expression,
the fiction that judges do not make law must be discarded.
Codes in the civilian tradition are general statements of
the law, statements of broad policy, statements of direction,
statements of law which are meant to have a long continuity
of existence. In some respects more similar to constitutions
than to statutory enactments, civil codes are meant to provide
a basic system of law which can acquire new life when necessary in changing time and circumstances. Codes in civilian
jurisdictions do not seek to solve particular legal problems or to
speak upon precise legal issues. Most civil codes cast aside the
idea of bringing together that which existed before. They usually
originate by discarding, almost as in a revolution, the existing
law and adopting new law in its place. Louisiana's first Civil
Code began as an attempt to compile an existing system of law.
The original mandate to the drafters of the 1808 Civil Code was
for a compilation of the Spanish laws in effect in Louisiana.
However, our Code of 1808 in end result had as its principal
source the Code Napoleon or its Projet and the French doctrinal
writers, with the Spanish influence persisting only in some
particular areas. The Civil Code of 1825 expressly provided in
article 3521 that all prior laws in existence in Louisiana were
repealed, "and that they shall not be invoked as laws, even
under the pretense that their provisions are not contrary or
repugnant to those of this Code." Two years later the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in Flower v. Grifiir attempted to continue
in effect the provisions of the old Code. Immediately following
that decision, legislation was enacted providing for the abroga30. 6 Mart.(N.S.) 89 (La. 1827).
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tion of "all the civil laws which were in force before the promulgation of the civil code lately promulgated." 81 Our Code,
then, is actually a general statement of an original body of civil
law for Louisiana.82
Civil codes differ drastically from the modern codes in common law jurisdictions. The codes of the common law states
are merely compilations of case law or statutes, similar to our
collection of statutory laws in the Louisiana Revised Statutes of
1950. Although statutory law is specific as compared to the statement of law in the civilian codes, the former, though more
explicit, is still not designed to give express answers to all
future litigation, for when the legislature enacts a statute,
it usually is seeking to cure a specific evil and therefore narrowly views the future consequences of the enactment. Its
attention will not be directed at other aspects of the evil or
the natural consequences which must flow from the corrective
process. Therefore under both the Code and the statutes there
will be many lacunae in the law which our Civil Code directs
the judge to fill from another source. It is in the filling of the
gaps in the law that the judge most frequently plays the role
of lawmaker. The method for supplying the law in such a
situation will vary according to the problem presented. Perhaps
the gap can be filled by use of custom in its historical meaning,
but custom under this narrow definition is not applicable in
modern society as frequently as it was when our Code was
adopted. Natural law, reason, and received usages as extensions
of custom are more easily resorted to. Jurisprudence which has
become accepted through long use and which is not contrary
to express law, along with doctrine, also offers assistance. Basically, when the law is silent, the judge is called upon to reason
how a legislative body would express itself upon the issue.
Induction, deduction, analogy, exegesis, empirical logic, historical
research, functional examination, free scientific research, and
reasoning processes of many nomenclatures may be called upon
singly or in combination according to the problem-solving needs
for filling the void.
31. La. Acts 1828, No. 83, § 25.
32. A. YIANNoPOULos, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYsTEM 53-70 (1971); Tucker,
Source Books of Louaiana Law, 6 TUL. L. Rsv. 280 (1932); Tucker, Source
Books of Louisiana Law, 7 Tu. L. Rmv. 82 (1932).
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Another fiction which must be dispelled is that when the
expression of the legislature is ambiguous, imprecise, or unclear,
the judiciary can easily find the meaning of that expression by
determining the legislative intent. Here the judge must look
to the intent of the lawmakers who, at a time in the past,
enacted the expression of law decisive of the issue to be adjudicated. The legislative intent may be ascertained by considering
the precise expression in the context of the whole cloth of the
law. It may be ascertained by an examination of laws in pari
materia. It may be ascertained by analogy with some other
expression upon the subject of the law. But many legal issues
presented for adjudication today arise out of situations which
could not have been encompassed within the most extreme fantasies and dreams of the legislators who enacted the laws perhaps a century before. Here is presented the serious problem
of ascertaining legislative intent when no intent could have
existed regarding the issue before the court. The supplying of
this intent results in lawmaking by the courta8 Supplying legislative intent becomes more difficult in modern society, for
changes in economic, technological, and social conditions come
about rapidly now instead of slowly over the years as in the
past.
Rapidity of change also makes more onerous the judge's
role in exercising the judicial function where a law has become
so obsolete that a literal application of the written expression
would produce a ridiculous result. The changing of constitutional interpretation by the United States Supreme Court also
lays new burdens upon our state judiciary when civil laws
regarded as valid for many years are suddenly held to be
unconstitutional. Because the legislature is not constantly in
session and because it often abdicates its responsibility to revise
and update the laws, our courts are sometimes required to
change positive expressions from the state legislature and supplement them with judicial expressions so as to harmonize our
law with the United States Supreme Court decisions.
One other aspect of the judicial function in Louisiana should
be examined to lay guidelines for determining whether the
judiciary is acting in a civilian tradition. Louisiana, like Quebec,
33. E. LEVi, Aw INTRODUCTION TO LmoAL REASONING 19-23 (1949).
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Puerto Rico, and a few other civil law jurisdictions, is enmeshed
in a national system which follows another legal tradition. This
situation may make it difficult for our courts to adhere to the
civilian tradition, but at the same time we should recognize
the very enviable position we occupy for the development and
evolving of the best possible system of civil law. Though adhering to the civil law tradition, our courts have ready access without any language barrier to a voluminous source of comparative
law, the study of which can enrich our own law when the courts
are unable to find express legislative will.
In the best of the civilian tradition our courts are required
to look to our sister jurisdictions for custom, natural law, reason, and received usages. While we in Louisiana remain civilian
in legal concept and in system, because of national ties and
common interests we are also a people of one nation who often
share common customs, a common understanding of what the
natural law should be, even a common approach to legal solutions through logic and reason. Because in a civilian tradition
the source of law second only to legislative will is custom, our
courts will of necessity resort to appraisals of customs without
our state boundaries and within our national borders because
we are a part of a larger community of common customs in
many areas of law. As adherents of the civilian tradition, we
initially examine the sources in our own system and our own
law for enlightenment, but we must also make our system live
in the context of its national existence. We benefit from this
approach, and our search for and use of the law and the jurisprudence of common law states for these purposes need not
detract from, taint, or limit our search for good civilian methods
in the best of its tradition.
AN INDEX OF THE RENAISSANCE

Are there concrete examples that there is a resurgence of
the civilian tradition in Louisiana? Since the academicians who
appraised our civil law system in 1937 said that the ability of
our courts to discard and overrule jurisprudence was an index
for determining whether we were in fact a civil law jurisdiction, a comparison of the situation they found in existence then
and the present situation should be helpful.
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While the overruling of case law is not, in and of itself,
determinative of a civil law approach by the courts, the recognition by the courts that jurisprudential law is not a binding
source of law is necessary in a true civilian system. These
appraisers8 4 in 1937 found that 76 cases had been overruled in
the previous 25 years. A cursory examination of the jurisprudence of the last five years shows that more than 25 cases
have been expressly overruled and an incalculable number have
been impliedly overruled.8 5 Perhaps more important than the
overruling of individual cases by name is that much of the
present jurisprudence has, by the very annunciation of the principles upon which the results rest, modified, extended, or discarded the reasoning of prior jurisprudence. For example, Laird
v. Travelers Insurance Co.a8 and Pierre v. Allstate Insurance
34. Daggett, Dainow, Hebert & McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A
Brief for the Civl Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1937).
35. A few examples will suffice to show the trend. In Blanchard v. Ogima,
253 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902 (1968), the reasoning and language of a number of
cases were impliedly overruled assigning a master's liability for the delicts
of his servants and it would appear that the rationale of a number of cases
assigning liability of a husband for the delicts of the wife on a community
errand will have to be overruled. See Comment, 33 LA. L. REv. 110 (1972).
Bowen v. Doyal, 259 La. 839, 253 So.2d 200 (1971), overruled two very recent
Supreme Court cases. State v. Morales, 256 La. 940, 240 So.2d 714 (1970),
overruled one case. American Creosote Co. v. Springer, 257 La. 116, 241 So.2d
510 (1970), overruled two cases in Louisiana jurisprudence on one point
and four cases on another point. In State v. Ray, 259 La. 105, 249 So.2d 540
(1971), the Supreme Court of Louisiana overruled five cases, the latest of
which was a 1967 decision. Moreover, in that case we used a vehicle seldom
if ever used in Louisiana-the prospective overruling of jurisprudence, or
what is commonly called the "Sunburst" approach. In Rockholt v. Keaty,
256 La. 629, 237 So.2d 663 (1970), this court effectively overruled a decision
by eliminating all the language and rationale of that decision not absolutely
required for the facts presented there. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258
La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971), without specific mention overruled the rationale
of a number of cases upon two points of law discussed there. For some
effects of Langlois, see the concurrence by the writer and Mr. Justice Tate
in the denial of writs in Theriot v. Transit Cas. Co., 267 So.2d 211 (La. 1972).
In a number of areas the language and rationale of previous decisions
have been effectively discarded without specific overruling. In various
aspects of workmen's compensation law, the court has effectively overruled
prior jurisprudence. Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 253 La. 1115, 221
So.2d 816 (1969), by necessary implication overruled one supreme court
decision and pointedly overruled a court of appeal case and a line of
jurisprudence which had narrowly defined the accidental aggravation of a
pre-existing disease. McDermott v. Funel, 258 La. 657, 247 So.2d 567 (1971),
overruled three cases. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227,
210 So.2d 328 (1968), expressly overruled three supreme court cases and six
appellate decisions. State v. Sandoz, 258 La. 297, 246 So.2d 21 (1971), overruled four cases. See also Heyse v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 255 La. 127, 229 So.2d
724 (1969).
36. 267 So.2d 714 (La. 1972).
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Co.,87 which are expansions of Dixie Drive It Yourself System v.
American Beverage Co., 8 strike down the former defense of
passive negligence, necessarily overruling numerous decisions
on this issue. Moreover, they are an evolvement of a new causation approach using cause-in-fact and duty-risk rather than proximate cause. Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.9 sets forth a new
basis for assigning liability for damages from ultrahazardous
activities. The application of other concepts involved in delictual
responsibility such as last clear chance and res ipsa loquitur,
the interpretation of the Workman's Compensation Act, and
the jurisprudence determining the validity of testaments are
just a few of the areas in which the court has shown its willingness to find new language and new rationale in applying statutory and codal law.
The willingness of the courts to disregard jurisprudence
and reappraise the actual source of law is only one index for
determining whether Louisiana courts are using civil law methodology. More important criteria for making this judgment
would be whether codal and statutory expression is the primary
source of law, whether custom, equity, reason, and common
usage are resorted to in the absence of legislative expression,
whether doctrine and other resources are used to supply a
practical, logical, and socially valid rule of law where it cannot
otherwise be determined.
The examples are so plentiful that it would be difficult to
choose which ones best establish the theory I have advanced.
Rather than exhibit the best examples of the civilian approach,
the writer has chosen his own writings to be displayed as
examples.4
37. 257 La. 471, 242 So.2d 821 (1971).
38. 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962). See also Hill v. Lundin & Associates,
260 La. 542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972).
39. 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971). See also the discussion of Blarnchard

v. Ogima, 235 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902 (1968), in connection with note 37, supra.
40. There are several reasons for this choice. First, an attempt by one
judge to appraise and criticize the writings of other members of the court
in a paper such as this may not be in the best tradition of professional
conduct demanded of judges. Second, the written opinion reflects only a
small part of the conceptual aspect of a jurist's determination of the
reasoning process to be applied and the result to be reached in a particular
case. The work, the research, and the intellectual battle consume far more
of the judge's time than the reduction of all this to a written opinion.
Like an iceberg, perhaps only one-ninth of the mass-the real technique,
method, legal concepts, and rationale-will be visible. Therefore one's own
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EVOLUTION OF A JURIST SEEKING THE CIVILIAN TRADITION

Shortly after coming to the supreme court in 1968, I was
41
the author of the majority opinion in Blanchard v. Ogima.
Here, although there was express language to the contrary in
a particular provision of the Code, we allowed a long and
undeviating line of jurisprudence to remain in effect which disregarded that specific codal provision. It is the reasoning why
the express language in the Code was not followed which must
be examined to see whether that opinion is in the civilian tradition.
Although Civil Code article 2320 makes masters liable for
their servants' delicts only when the masters "might have prevented the act which caused the damage, and have not done it,"
our jurisprudence attached strict vicarious liability to masters
for their servants' delicts. The historical comparative analysis
of the common law and civil law approaches in this field showed
a parallel development with almost simultaneous extensions and
limitations of responsibility in each system. Particularly considering the jurisprudential departure in light of the development of vicarious liability in our common law states, we were
impressed that both our system and the system in the other
states simultaneously used the same concept in approaching the
socio-economic problem of liability of a master for a servant in
commerce. Examining the problem in the light of present-day
commercial economic needs, I wrote for the majority:
"Louisiana jurisprudence has not interpreted this restriction literally, and the demands of modern commerce and
the needs of society would not permit such a stringent and
severe limitation of the liability of the master for his servant.
However, by inquiring into the overall relationship of the
parties and the element of control, our jurisprudence has
established reasonable definitions and limitations of vicarious
writings can be examined with a better knowledge (although it be subjective) of the total thought process which went into the opinions. Moreover, admittedly it is easier to analyze one's own work because the research
was done when the opinions were written and need not be repeated now.
The examples used here propose only to show an evolution of the juristic
approach of one man trying to employ the civilian tradition as a judge
In a civilian system in a nation adhering to a contrary system of law.
41. 253 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902 (1968).
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liability to replace the literal codal restriction which has
42
fallen into desuetude."
We noted that the literal pronouncement of the Code was
not strictly one of vicarious liability, for it imposed liability
only upon the negligent master, that is, one who by omitting
to act was at fault. However, we concluded, after appraisal of
the jurisprudence as a source of deviation and with a proper
reconsideration of legislative purpose under prevailing economic
realities, that the jurisprudential declaration was a logical
response to present-day exigencies for fixing liability upon the
master vicariously without regard to his own fault. In modern
commerce the master's business practices have built-in extra
charges for his services and products sufficient to cover economic
recompense to those who are harmed by his servants in the
exercise of his business pursuits for his financial advantage.
Therefore the vicarious responsibility of the master for the
damage caused by his servants' delicts in the pursuit of the
master's economic interests is imposed to give an economic
source for recompense to innocent third parties.
Important also in Ogima is the fact that the court reaffirmed
that this vicarious responsibility arose from a master-servant
relationship under Civil Code article 2320, and not from a mandatary (principal-agent) relationship under Civil Code article
3000. In this particular area the court could very well have
followed through with an express overruling of a number of
cases which in their reasoning and language used mandate
terms rather than master-servant terms to impose liability under
Civil Code article 2320.48
As already stated, Blanchard v. Ogima refused to overrule
prior jurisprudence which had deviated from the strict language
of the Code. In Carter v. Moore,44 when the majority pretermitted the issue of the ownership of the bottoms of navigable
waters, I wrote a concurring opinion advocating the overruling
of three cases involving a so-called rule of property. At first
42. 253 La. at 43, 215 So.2d at 905.
43. See Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 215 So.2d 902 (1968); Daggett,
Dainow, Hebert & McMahon, A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brief for the
Civil Law of Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1937); Comment, 33 LA. L. REV.

110 (1972).
44. 258 La. 921, 248 So.2d 813 (1971).

1973]

CIVILIAN TRADITION IN LOUISIANA

glance these would seem to be inconsistent positions, but a
careful reading of the Carter concurrence and the Blanchard
opinion will show that there is no real divergence in the views
expressed, for the result obtained in one and the result sought
in the other are both founded on civilian approaches which are
fitted to the problem-solving required in the particular cases.
The concurrence in Carter I believe to be my best approach
to good civilian methodology in opinion-writing. It also reflects
my view of the jurist's role as well as the role of jurisprudence
in a civilian system. First examining the Code articles pertinent
to the issue raised there, next surveying the history of the
evolution of the statutory law and the jurisprudence which also
concerned the problem, then examining Louisiana doctrinal
writings upon the subject, the concurrence concluded that three
cases- Realty Operators v. State Mineral Board,45 Humble Oil
& Refining Co. v. State Mineral Board,46 and California Co. v.
Price 47 -decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana had departed from the Code law and from other jurisprudence correctly
interpreting that law and should be overruled.
48
Having found these three cases to be inversely pyramided,
I wrote:

"Finally, in my view the concept of this so-called rule of
property has little or no validity in this civilian jurisdiction. That concept stems from the theory of stare decisis, is
founded entirely upon common law, and finds no basis in
our Constitution, in our Civil Code, or in our statutory law.
A study of the jurisprudence will show that the rule has
been used in order to obtain a result in some cases but just
as quickly discarded in other cases. I favor stability of law,
of course, and constancy of jurisprudence. Here, however,
the reversal of the Price, Humble, and Realty Operators
cases would restore the constancy of the jurisprudence and
reinstate the long-standing law and public policy of the
state."

49

45. 202 La. 398, 12 So.2d 198 (1942).
46. 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839 (1953).
47. 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954).
48. "That jurisprudence begins with dicta, continues without resort to
law, and ends in what it calls an 'unbroken line of jurisprudence.'
49. Carter v. Moore, 258 La. 921, 959, 248 So.2d 813, 826 (1971).
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That concurrence and Mr. Justice Tate's concurrence on
application for rehearing show our concern over the fact that
Price, Humble, and Realty Operators are contrary to a basic
concept of public policy ingrained in our civil law as it was
practiced in Louisiana even before the adoption of the Code and
particularly contrary to that public policy as expressly stated
in the Code. The basic policy question is how and to what extent
our State controls navigable waters. Our concept has always
been that the bottoms of navigable waters belonged to the State,
and that the necessary control of navigable waters below the
surface, at the surface, and above the surface was exercised
by the State under that concept. My feeling was that mere
statutory interpretation through a few cases could not destroy
such a fundamental, necessary concept of our law; that those
jurisprudential holdings were not only contra legem but also
against public policy.
Dickson v. Sandefur50 afforded the opportunity for extensive
use of doctrine in making an in-depth study of the history of
the source and evolution of Louisiana Civil Code article 518,ri
beginning with an examination of the minutes of the Council
of State which passed the Projet of the French Civil Code, the
comments of the members of the council who worked on the
Projet, proceeding to such doctrinal writers as Demolombe, Toullier, Laurent, Daviel, Chardon, and Planiol, and to Louisiana
doctrine. The opinion rejected the common law doctrine of
avulsion relied upon by the court of appeal, and resolved the
issue under the express language of Civil Code article 518.
Numerous opinions emanating from all of our appellate courts
indicate the great impact the new translations of doctrinal writ-2
ings and our own doctrinal writings have upon the judiciary6
In Pringle-AssociatedMortgage Corp. v. Eanes,68 the majority on original hearing reversed the court of appeals' holding
50. 259 La. 473, 250 So.2d 708 (1971).
51. LA. CrWL CODE art. 518: "If a river or stream, whether navigable or

not, opens itself a new bed by leaving its former channel, the owners of
the soil newly occupied shall take, by way of indemnification, the former
bed of the river, every one in proportion to the quantity of land he has lost.
"They shall again take their former property, If the river or stream
returns to its former channel."
52. Dainow, Planiol Citation& by Louisiana Courts: 1959-1966, 27 LA. L.
Rsv. 231 (1967); Dainow, The Use of English Translation of Planol by

Louisiana Courts, 14 Am. J. COMP. L. 68 (1965).
53. 254 La. 705, 226 So.2d 502 (1969).
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which had overruled an old supreme court case, Tilly v. Bauman. 4 I stated in dissent on original hearing:

"The majority opinion fails to give meaning to the unambiguous language in the Civil Code, is contrary to the civilian
concept of subrogation by law, disregards a long line of
jurisprudence and the Code which make privileges stricti
juris, and particularly repudiates and contravenes the direct
legislative expressions of R.S. 9:4801 and 4812. I am in total
agreement with a statement quoted by the majority from
Ziegler, supra: 'After all, on this question, is not the Code
itself enough? . . .'

"I find that the Civil Code, our jurisprudence (except for
Tilly v. Bauman), and our statutory law are explicit-so
explicit that Tilly v. Bauman should be overruled as being
erroneous, eddying alone and apart out of the mainstream
of our law."' 5
On rehearing the court reinstated the Court of Appeal's judgment and overruled Tilly v. Bauman.
A dissent best discloses that this writer has previously felt
not only the need to examine the role of a judge and the
methodology to be used in a civilian system but also the need
to express the technique which was used in determining the
rule of law. This dissent is not offered to further argue the incorrectness of the majority view but is offered only to show the
evolution of the writer's juridical approach to civil law problemsolving. This case, Tannehill v. Tannehill," posed the question
of whether sterility could form the basis of an action en desaveu.
The majority held that sterility induced by disease was not a
ground for disavowal. The dissent answered:
"Not only do I disagree with the result and with the historical interpretation given to Article 185 of our Civil Code,
but I strongly take issue with the majority's method and
technique of judicial interpretation. The use of exegetical
approach in isolation does not discharge the judicial obligation when our court works to and through the Code. While
54. 174 La. 71, 139 So. 762 (1932).
55. Pringle-Associated Mtg. Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 734, 226 So.2d
502, 512-13 (1969).
56. 261 La. 933, 261 So.2d 619 (1972).
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exegesis is certainly helpful, often very enlightening, it can
entomb the court and the law in the darkness of the past.
The combination of the exegetical, the empirical, and the
functional methods of interpretation is required in order
that the law serve the people, that the law be a reflection
of the people's understanding, desires, and needs. Moreover,
the more comprehensive approach is required under the
mandate of our Code itself .

. ."

(Quoting Civil Code

articles 18, 3, and 21 and French Civil Code article 4.)57

After discussing Mr. Justice Tate's Techniques of Judicial
Interpretation in Louisiana,58 the dissent concluded:
"While we may not in Louisiana be permitted the free
rein G~ny calls for, we certainly can use the techniques of
G~ny and the French jurists to determine our law when it
is doubtful in language and dubious in meaning. We are
a civilian jurisdiction, and we should as a court follow that
tradition.
"What change in policy is needed here to reach the result
this dissent offers? What has been the policy of the state
on disavowal for sterility? The courts have been silent. The
Code is silent. A functional approach supports the policy
I advocate. Comparative law analysis supports that policy.
The issue before us must be decided, and it cannot be deferred to legislative counsel. Basing its determination not to
fairly adjudicate the issue before it solely upon an historical
excursion into the past, the court has not complied with the
spirit of the Code or the letter of the Code in discharging
the judicial function.
"As our Code says, the most important consideration is
to determine the true meaning, reason, and spirit of a law.
Surely the vast majority of the people-and this would
be reflected in their legislative representatives-would find
it almost unfathomable that the law would allow disavowal
for impotence but not for sterility. Is this fine distinction
valid? Does it serve any purpose? Is it the custom of the
people as reflected in their mental processes? Is this distinc57. Id. at 954, 261 So.2d at 627.
58. 22 LA. L. Riv. 727 (1962).
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tion the public policy of this state? Does the public believe
and understand that one condition justifies bastardy and the
other does not?" 59
A particular series of cases illustrates the very slow evolution of a jurisprudential rule of law in a single area of the
0 a case
law. In Reymond v. State, Department of Highways,8
which has been defined as a "cause c~l~bre," the writer, as
author of the majority opinion, stated that the basis in Louisiana for assigning responsibility for damage from hazardous
or inherently dangerous activities was not to be found in the
law of property of Civil Code article 667. That article creates
a true predial servitude upon one estate in favor of an adjoining
estate forbidding the "construction" or the "making of works"
which damage the neighbor or deprive him of the enjoyment
of his estate. The opinion specifically said we did not overrule
the result obtained in the jurisprudence which had allowed
recovery for damages from use of dangerous instrumentalities
or man's engagement in inherently hazardous activities; we simply found article 667 inapplicable.
Voluminous criticism of this opinion appeared in the Louisiana Law Review.01 Some of the critics-justifiably, because they
were unable to determine from the case except in dictum the
future basis for hazardous activity recovery-were concerned for
the holding and its consequential effects. It must be remembered
that an opinion can resolve only the issue before the court and
cannot expound upon all the situations that might arise as a consequence of the holding, as can be done in law review commentaries. However, in cases after Reymond the writer has attempted
to unfold more of the rationale for the holding there and to set
forth the consequences of that holding. The principle of law
which has finally evolved is now almost uniformly accepted by
the academicians.
0 2 the majority
In Robichaux v. Huppenbauer,
partially enjoined as a nuisance certain methods of operating a stable. In a
concurrence this writer expounded upon a footnote in Reymond
59. Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933, 954-58, 261 So.2d 619, 628-29 (1972).
60. 255 La. 425, 231 So.2d 375 (1970).
61. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1969-1970 TermProperty, Torts, Mineral Rights d Expropriation, 31 LA. L. Rxv. 196, 217;
231; 263, 282; 325, 329, 335 (1971).
62. 258 La. 139, 245 So.2d 385 (1971).
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which stated that article 669 was a vehicle for defining the limits
of the activities of man in use of property as they affect his
neighbors. The source, the error of omission in translation from
French to English in our earlier texts, and the evolution of that
article were discussed. I found that under article 669 we could,
according to "the rules of the police, or the customs of the place,"
determine all of those activities of man which were insufferable
inconveniences in vicinage requiring abatement or control.
Then in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,8 the implication
in Reymond and the concurring statement in Robichaux v. Huppenbauer came full circle to a final conclusion. Here, in a delictual action where all parties litigant agreed that the defendant
was responsible for damage ensuing when a poisonous gas escaped from its plant, numerous theories and Code articles were
argued as a basis for responsibility in order to advance or to
meet the special defense to liability. Writing for the majority,
I stated: "[t]heir [the parties'] dilemma is partially the result of
inconsistence in jurisprudential assignment of a legal basis for
allowing recovery for damages resulting from the dangerous and
harmful activities and enterprises." 64 Our court then held that
article 2315 was the basis for assigning delictual damages when
man is at fault. More importantly, however, we clearly and concisely held that "fault" in article 2315 encompasses more than
just negligence. We said:
"Here we find that proof that the gas escaped is sufficient, and proof of lack of negligence and lack of imprudence
will not exculpate the defendant. The defendant has injured
this plaintiff by its fault as analogized from the conduct
required under Civil Code Article 669 and others, and responsibility for the damage attaches to defendants under
Article 2315."65
We held the plaintiff's cause of action delictual under article
2315, and, "after a study of the law and customs, a balancing of
claims and interests, a weighing of the risk and the gravity of
harm, and a consideration of individual and societal rights and
obligations,""" we concluded that the defendant had carried on
63.
64.
65.
66.

258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971).
Id. at 1073, 249 So.2d at 136.
Id. at 1084, 249 So.2d at 140.
Id.
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an activity for which it must respond in damages if the activity
causes injury to another even though the defendant acts as prudently as possible in the conduct of the activity. We held that
the fault concept of article 2315 may be supplied by analogy from
other Code provisions or statutes which lay down rules of conduct under particular relationships.
In these cases Civil Code article 667 was defined as a law
of real property creating a predial servitude, and article 669 was
defined as a non-property rule6 7 and the source for determining
the insufferable inconveniences and hazardous activities which
the law would control for all in the neighborhood. However,
apparently the value of a distinction between the two articles
was not clearly set forth.
Finally in dissent in Hilliard v. Shuff6s I tried to supply what
I believed to be the cogent reasons for making the exacting distinction between article 667 and article 669 which had not previously been clearly stated in the jurisprudence. Hilliard posed
the problem of whether to require abatement of a construction
on property adjacent to the plaintiff's which the evidence established possessed high potential for causing serious damage. The
majority relied on article 669, treating the inadequate storage
tank which contained volatile fuels under high pressure as a
"nuisance." The majority found some evidence in the record
that the plaintiff had not been able in fact to fully enjoy his estate. It gave only partial relief, remanding for the trial court to
find what remedy could be afforded so plaintiff could have full
enjoyment of his estate. Undoubtedly there was high potential
for damage from the fuel tank as constructed and used on the
border of plaintiff's property. I found nothing in the record to
support a finding that the plaintiff had in fact been damaged,
suffered an inconvenience, or been deprived of the use and enjoyment of his estate, but I reasoned that I did not need to. I
would, even in the absence of such finding, have ordered the
removal of the offending tank or at least the abatement of its
67. By the terms of article 669, there are not two estates, a dominant
and a servient estate; It applies to people on the same premises, to the
entire neighborhood, to people who are not owners or holders under any
title susceptible of acquiring a servitude.
68. 260 La. 384, 256 So.2d 127 (1972).
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present use under the property rule of article 667.69 I reasoned
that under this predial servitude the owner of the dominant
estate, on an objective finding of probability that at some time he
might be deprived of the enjoyment of his property or suffer
damage because of the work or construction made upon the
servient estate, had the right to cause its removal.
Because few if any legal principles stand in isolation, the
court's examination of one principle under a particular set of
facts must be limited to an acceptance of all other legal principles which bear only collaterally upon it. While the court may
address itself to the correction of error in relation to one Code
article or one statute, it cannot address itself to the whole body
of law which may affect or be affected by the specific law considered. For example, the development of Civil Code article 2315
by analogy with Civil Code article 669 as a source for assessing
damage from ultrahazardous or dangerous instrumentalities was
dictated by the prior jurisprudence on other aspects of delictual
responsibility. Earlier decisions had upon many occasions
awarded damages in these instances directly under article 669
without requiring proof of any negligence. Our Civil Code article
2317, in the exact language of a provision in the French Code
Civil article 1384, makes us responsible for "the things which
we have in our custody." The French have assigned the liability
for damages from hazardous activities and dangerous instrumentalities in the absence of negligence under their article 1384, but
in numerous Louisiana cases, the last as recent as 1969, Cartwright
v. Firemen's Insurance Co.,70 our courts have said that we are
responsible for things under our control under article 2317 only
when we are negligent because that article is modified by Civil
Code article 2315. Before Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp.,7 1
fault under article 2315 was defined as negligence. Therefore we
could not remove the jurisprudential stricture upon article 2317
until we held in Langlois that fault, as expressed in article 2315,
encompassed acts which cause damage other than negligent acts.
69. LA. Crv. CODE art. 667: "Although a proprietor may do with his estate
whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be
the cause of any damage to him." (Emphasis added.)
70. 254 La. 330, 223 So.2d 822 (1969); see discussion In Comment, 44 TUL.
L. REv. 119, 147-49 (1969).
71. 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971).
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In Theriot v. Transit Casualty Co.,7 2 Mr. Justice Tate and I joined
in a concurrence in a writ denial, noting that the rationale of
Cartwright and the jurisprudence which limited recovery under
article 2317 to negligence were no longer applicable. If the court
follows the concepts of Langlois and this concurrence, Civil Code
article 2317 may, with or even exclusive of article 669, under
article 2315 provide a broader base for liability for damages from
ultrahazardous activities and dangerous instrumentalities. Here
may also be found a vehicle for resolving product liability cases.
The future will be determined by the doctrine which develops
around the cases and by the briefs and argument of the attorneys
before the courts as they persuade the courts of this state of the
correct position to be taken under our Civil Code.
The discussion of the cases involving articles 667 and 669
indicates the limitations upon a court when it approaches a
problem requiring new rules of law. A court cannot lay down
broad, general principles in a single piece of litigation under a
particular set of facts. A court must weave these rules of law
case by case, and the whole cloth cannot be seen until many
particular issues have been judicially determined.
Although courts are not well suited for developing general
statements of the law and although courts err in applying, interpreting, and developing law, it is apparent that jurisprudence,
while not a primary source, is a valid source of law in some instances. Sometimes a legislature fails to fill a gap or to supply
a new principle in place of one which has so fallen into desuetude
that its application would bring an absurd result. Then the
judiciary, which cannot avoid deciding a case before it, will
finally evolve a broad principle or rule of law through a series
of cases. It is such jurisprudence, formed in the exercises of this
judicial function, which constitutes a source of law.
Actually, a court may move in the wrong direction and have
to retrench when new rules of law are sought. Rowe v. Travelers
Insurance Co.73 and Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co.7 4 are good
examples of a learning process experienced by this writer. The
two cases were factually similar, presented the same legal ques72. 267 So.2d 211 (La. 1972).
73. 253 La. 659, 219 So.2d 486 (1969).
74. 267 So.2d 714 (La. 1972).
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tion, and required the same judicial determination. Since both
opinions reached the same result, neither need be said to be
wrong in result. However, a different approach, different language, and a different rationale were used in each. 75 The error
of using the wrong process in the judicial determination in Rowe
was recognized in Laird, admitted, and corrected. A comparison
of these two cases, which were decided only about two years
apart, illustrates jurisprudential error and correction, and affords
another reason for the validity of the principle that jurisdiction
should not be the primary source of law. It also validates the
Louisiana practice of overruling jurisprudence.
THE FUTURE OF THE RENAISSANCE

Perhaps the analysis of these writings will persuade the
reader that the Louisiana judiciary is following the lead of the
academicians and attempting to fulfill its role in the civil law
tradition. If our courts are truly acting in the civil law tradition, the practicing lawyers of this state will find new challenges
and opportunities and will assume greater responsibility for developing our law. If we recognize that the courts' first obligation
in evaluating any case is to examine and research for an answer
in the primary source of law, the codes or some other legislative
expression, then the lawyer cannot necessarily determine the
rights of his clients by finding a "goose case." He must first seek
the legislative will through the codes and the statutes instead
of the case law. If the written law is silent, ambiguous, or obsolete, he must look for other sources of law in preparing his case.
The advocate will teach the court the underlying philosophy and
theory of the principle he professes so that the court may ascertain the spirit of the law. Since jurisprudence is not one of the
primary sources of law, the lawyer will most often cite and argue
cases not as a source but as the rationale for the method of applying the law, as a basis for analogy, as an example of reason
and logic, and as a good sample of judicial interpretation of the
75. Both Rowe and Laird involved a stopped vehicle which only slightly
infringed upon the lane of travel of the following vehicle, leaving sufficient
room in that lane for passage. There was no traffic approaching in the
other lane, and that lane of travel was unobstructed. Rowe used the proximate cause approach, and Laird used the cause-in-fact duty-risk approach.
To the writer's mind the latter case presents the proper reasoning for the
result which was obtained in each case.
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law. The cases will be used for their doctrinal value after an
evaluation of the sources stating the doctrine.
One reason for believing that civil law tradition will continue to strengthen in Louisiana is the mass of new doctrinal
writings in the making, some of which are even now in the press.
My work with the Civil Code has been greatly facilitated by the
7
There is soon
Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana.
of
the
Civil
Codes of
a
new
compiled
edition
to be published
Louisiana which not only will afford a quick examination of the
sources and evolvement of our Code but will also include concordance tables and cross-references to all the existing translations and treatises and other works already published.77 Also
forthcoming are a work on predial servitudes, an additional work
on obligations, a collection of original treatises on the civil law
system in mixed jurisdictions, 8 and a book on G6ny's theory
7
of jurisprudence in the law.

9

The appellate judges of this state have been given the opportunity for continuing education in the civil law tradition.
This opportunity must be extended to the entire judiciary. Firstyear law students at some of the law schools are given the opportunity to study the basics of the civil law tradition, and I
propose that this should be a requirement of curriculum at all
schools. Only a few upperclassmen have had the advantage of
an in-depth study of the philosophy and theory of the civil law
tradition. I believe that all upperclassmen who intend to practice
in Louisiana need an in-depth comparative study of present civil
law systems as well as a study of the use of the civilian tradition
in Louisiana's civil law system. Also, there should be a greater
consideration of programs in continuing legal education for the
practicing lawyer in the civil law tradition. The program should
not be developed around single aspects of the civil law alone,
76. 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF
LOUISIANA (La. St. L. Inst., Part I, 1940; Part II, 1942), published pursuant
to La. Acts 1938, No. 165.
77. 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA (1972) (J.
Dainow ed.).
78. THE: ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED
JURISDICTIONS (1973) (J. Dainow ed.) a collection of essays by scholars with
focus on Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland, South Africa, France, Germany, Israel,
Mexico, and other jurisdictions.
79. J. MAYDA, FRANgoIS GfONY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE.
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but should include an approach to a philosophical understanding
and evaluation of the whole of the civilian tradition.
A discourse upon the renaissance of the civil law tradition
in Louisiana must not omit mention of the Louisiana State Law
Institute's continuous revision of the Civil Code. In addition to
revision in that Code accomplished through the Institute's redaction of our new Code of Civil Procedure, the revision of Book II
of the Civil Code is already well under way, and revision of Book
III has begun. If this writer is correct in believing that a Civil
Code is not a single restatement of law or jurisprudence but is a
statement of the best law within the whole context of the system
of law, then in revision it is to be hoped the legislature will not
simply adopt prior jurisprudential statements or restatements of
legal principles already outmoded and antiquated. The Institute
should not fear to propose the very best law as it presents portions of the Code if that law fits within the total scheme of our
Code. It is the obligation of the legislature to express through
the Civil Code this state's public policy. If the legislature will
not state public policy because the principle involved is controversial, it invites the judiciary to usurp the legislative function,
for whether controversial or not, when an issue becomes a case
before the court, a pronouncement of basic policy may necessarily
follow from the decision of the issue. Under several articles of
the Code of Criminal Procedure the redactors' comments actually
state that because the law in that particular area was in a state
of flux or that the resolution of the law was controversial, that
Code purposely omitted to make a statement upon the law. When
the legislature does this in one of our Codes, the lawmakers have
relegated themselves to a secondary role in making law. They
actually force the judiciary into a function for which it is not
designed, which it does not wish to assume, and which would,
except for the abdication of the legislative responsibility and the
existing Code authority, be an unconstitutional exercise of power
by the judiciary. As Professor Yiannopoulos has stated: "common law statutes have the force of law because judges permit it;
in civil law judges can legislate because statutes allow the practice!"8 0 As stated earlier, our Civil Code originally was a new
statement of the best law as understood by the drafters. The re80. A. YuIANNOPOULOS,
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vision of it should be a new expression of the best law which the
reason of the people reflects through the will of the legislature.8 1
If this paper appears to overstate the present position of
Louisiana's legal system or the academicians' and the jurists'
roles in this system, this probably results from enthusiasm for
future possibilities in the development of our legal system. In
the judicial process in any system justice through reason must
always be sought. Reason is generally better derived in a democracy through the concensus of the people who compose it as
expressed by their representatives. But reason in particular cases
has been assigned to the adversary arena of the courtroom, where
the academically trained advocate tries to bring a court's mind
and conscience to a decision of justice through reason. Reason
cannot always be drawn directly from a concensus of the people's
will as expressed through their representatives. When there is
silence in the law, ambiguity, obsoleteness, or absurdity or undue
hardship in result, then the lawyer and the judge must work
together to resolve the problem by supplying words or even
changing words to receive the content which the community
would give to them. It is here that all the legal profession will
apply von Jhering's much paraphrased aphorism: "Through the
Code but beyond it." As we go to the light to see, not the light
itself, but what it illuminates, so we go to the Code for the enlightenment it provides.
To acknowledge that there can be no complete agreement as to reason under our institution of justice until it has
been confirmed in the adversary arena of the court is to understand the purpose for which the institution was fashioned.8 2 With
that understanding the academicians, the attorneys, and the
judges will together fashion and preserve a civilian tradition in
Louisiana which will constantly seek for justice through reasonthrough law.
81. Morrow, An Approach to the Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code,
10 LA. L. REV. 59 (1949) and 23 TUL. L. REV. 478 (1949); Morrow, Current
Prospects for Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code, 33 TM. L. REV. 143
(1958); Smith, Law Revision in Lou4siana in Retrospect, 19 LA. L. REV. 34
(1958).
82. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949).

